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Economy Frustrates Enforcement of the Human
Rights Regime for Billions of the World’s Most
Marginalized Citizens
Brett J. Miller*
¶1

¶2

How is it possible that in a world of six and a half billion people, roughly four
billion of them are living outside of the law, beyond the reach of many basic human
rights protections? 1 The answers are as complex and diverse as the vast number of
people who make up the question, but the unifying connection lies in what has been
called the “informal economy.”2 This article is a modest attempt to extend the work of
development economists and legal scholars who have studied the informal economy to
the issue of the human rights corpus. The range of human rights implicated and the
uniqueness found in each of the world’s extralegal sectors make this undertaking too
immense to fully develop here. Nevertheless, this article will proceed by broadly
examining the informal phenomenon and its consequences, identifying the ways human
rights are implicated, and finally offering proposals for moving forward. It is impossible
to bring every person and transaction into the formal sector. 3 Despite this challenge, the
human rights community’s goal remains providing everyone with the protections of the
human rights regime.
This article will argue that for state actors to fulfill their responsibility to enforce
human rights, they must build coherent legal regimes in functional market economies that
bring the cost of formality below that of informa lity. Additionally, international
instruments must adequately provide for these rights and include reporting and
enforcement mechanisms as a means to apply international pressure upon state violators.
Only when state and international actors fulfill their respective duties will the human
rights regime overcome the pitfalls of informality and provide those who seek such
protection a means to afford, and incentive to freely choose, existence within the law.

*

J.D. candidate, May 2007, Northwestern University School of Law; B.B.A. Marketing and
Management, University of Portland, May 2003. The author would like to thank Prof. Michael Davis and
Merlin Camozzi for their assistance in topic development. Additionally, thanks go out to Matt Wernz for
his assistance and contributions. Finally, the author would like to thank and apologize to his family and
friends who have had the misfortune of listening to longwinded, incoherent, rambling explanations of this
project over the last year.
1
Institute for Liberty and Democracy, Home Page, at http://www.ild.org.pe/home.htm (last visited Apr.
6, 2006).
2
Also referred to as the “extralegal,” “underground,” or “black-market” economy. These terms will be
used interchangeably throughout this article.
3
It would be impossible and inefficient to regulate every transaction, activity, and behavior. A certain
amount of illegality, moonlighting, corruption, and cash-based transactions is inevitable because the cost of
preventing them is prohibitively expensive.
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I. THE INFORMAL ECONOMY
¶3

“The informal economy is . . . characterized by one central feature: it is unregulated
by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities
are regulated.”4
A. Activities

¶4

The informal economy is comprised of activities ranging from the illegal to the
ordinary, such as narcotics trafficking or professionals who moonlight for cash. Much of
the developing world’s informality surrounds activities and people within the labor,
housing, and commercial sectors. These informal sectors are characterized by an absence
of legal licenses, titles, and regulatory supervision. Residents in informal housing are
essentially squatters, which makes eviction an ever-present threat. Informal businesses
operate without licenses and do not pay taxes. 5 The more illicit side of informality
involves the sex trade, drugs, slavery, sweatshops, money laundering, smuggling, the
arms trade, and other various black- markets. Additionally, worldwide there is a
prevalence of work done outside of the formal legal regime, often by illegal immigrants,
involving work in agriculture, domestic service, factories, restaurants and hotels. 6 The
tremendous breadth of informal activities helps explain the prominence of extralegal
sectors.
B. Location and Size

¶5

¶6

The informal economy is present throughout the world. The most prevalent
extralegal sectors are found in the Third World and post-Communist States transitioning
to market economies. 7 In such developing and transitioning nations, 80% of the
population exists as “informals.”8 Yet, informal sectors also exist in countries
representing every stage of the development spectrum. Thus, while the vast majority of
informals are found in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and former Communist countries, the
United States is also home to many who live or work outside of the formal sector. 9
Extralegal sectors vary in size dramatically from country to country, but estimates
and examples will help gauge the scope of informal sectors relative to the economies in
which they operate. In Russia, the underground economy has been estimated to represent
as much as 30-40% of all personal incomes 10 and account for up to 50% of gross

4

Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes, World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics, and Effects of the
Informal Economy, in THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: STUDIES IN A DVANCED AND LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES 12 (Alejandro Portes et al. eds., John Hopkins Univ. Press 1989).
5
See generally, HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD
W ORLD (I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 1989) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH].
6
Free the Slaves, Washington, D.C., & the Human Rights Center of the Univ. of Cal., Berkeley,
Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States, 23 BERKELEY J. INT ’L L. 47, 48 (2005).
7
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: W HY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE ? 15 (Basic Books, 2000) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE M YSTERY OF CAPITAL ].
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Daniel McGrory, Civilizing the Russian Underground Economy: Requirements and Prospects for
Establishing a Civil Economy in Russia, 5 TRANSNAT ’L L. & CONTEMP . PROBS. 65, 71 (1995).
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domestic product (GDP). 11 In other countries transitioning to market economies, the
extralegal sector is also very large. The informal economy comprises 50% of GDP in
Ukraine, 62% in Georgia, 12 and 80% of the total economy in Armenia. 13 For nonEuropean Union immigrants moving to Italy, 62% will find their first job in the
underground economy and 30% will remain there. 14 In Africa, Za mbia has only 10% of
its entire workforce employed in the formal sector. 15 This pattern persists in the Western
Hemisphere where the International Labor Organization has estimated that 85% of new
jobs in Latin America and the Caribbean are being created in the informal sector. 16
Taken altogether, the informal portion of the Latin American urban workforce grew from
25.6% in 1980 to 31.9% in the 1990’s. 17 By 1994, the informal sector had become the
largest sector of urban employment in Latin America at 33.2%. 18 The size of the informal
economy in the United States is hard to determine because of its clandestine and
persecuted nature. 19 Yet, estimates from 1994 placed unreported income at $492 billion,
representing 9.6% of all personal income and 8.1% of GDP in the United States. 20
C. Causes
¶7

Extralegal sectors derive from a plethora of causes and unique local conditions.
Nevertheless, some consistent circumstances are found around the world. People may be
driven into underground economies through bare necessity. The legal regime of a
country can be perfectly adequate, but immediate pressing need may lead an individual to
engage in prostitution, 21 child labor, or narcotics trafficking. While good governance is
not immune to extralegality, the lack of such a system exacerbates the problem.
Government corruption is present in all countries in varying degrees, but is especially
prevalent in developing and transitioning economies, leading to thriving black-markets. 22
If the system is administered in a corrupt, incoherent, exorbitantly expensive,
discriminatory or elitist manner, then many are forced into informality as the law does
not protect them.

11

See DE SOTO, THE M YSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 69.
Id.
13
Jack McMahon, A Year in Armenia, 43-DEC A DVOC. 19 (Dec. 2000).
14
Kitty Calavita, Law, Citizenship, and the Construction of (Some) Immigrant ‘Others’, 30 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 401, 413 (2005).
15
DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL , supra note 7, at 69.
16
Id.
17
Guillermo O’Donnell, Poverty and Inequality in Latin America: Some Political Reflections, in 49
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA: ISSUES AND NEW CHALLENGES 50 (Victor E. Tokman &
Guillermo O’Donnell eds., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1998).
18
The other sectors analyzed were: small-enterprise at 22.5%, large and medium enterprise at 30.8% and
public employment at 13.6%. Carlos H. Filgueira, Welfare and Citizenship: Old and New Vulnerabilities,
in 119 POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA : ISSUES AND NEW CHALLENGES, 131-32 (Victor E.
Tokman & Guillermo O’Donnell eds., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1998).
19
Castells and Portes, supra note 4, at 20.
20
Morton Paglin, The Underground Economy: New Estimates from Household Income and Expenditure
Surveys, 103 YALE L.J. 2239, 2249 (1994).
21
Kelly Schwab, Comment, The Sexual Exploitation of Children: Suppressing the Global Demand and
Domestic Options for Regulating Prostitution, 13 TUL. J. INT ’L & COMP . L. 333, 352 (2005).
22
Helena Kolenda, One Party, Two Systems: Corruption in the People’s Republic of China and
Attempts to Control It , 4 J. CHINESE L. 187, 192-93, 201, 204-05 (1990).
12
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¶8

The written laws in countries with vast informal sectors are frequently not arcane,
but the most modern and elegant legal systems in the world. 23 When small extralegal
sectors exist, the problem is one of law enforcement. However, when forty to fifty
percent of the population disobeys the law, as is the case in many developing and postCommunist countries, the social efficiency of the law is the problem. 24 Laws are socially
efficient when accepted, observed, or used by a vast majority of the community to which
they are directed; 25 essentially, the law must reflect the heterogeneous social realities of
its people. The main difficulty in writing laws in the developing world is a lack of
information. Lawmakers often cope by borrowing the most modern comparative foreign
laws, which may not be suitable for local circumstances. 26 Therefore, whether a country
has the best laws that money can buy or is adhering to laws illegitimately promulgated by
de facto regimes, the result is a system of governance that drives people into informality
based on its incoherence. 27
¶9
The history of development also offers consistent patterns leading to informality.
Often, a largely agrarian society is quickly pushed into an industrial revolution, not
altogether unlike the experience of the United States. 28 Massive migration to cities
results, facilitated by the construction of modern highways, perceived high standards of
urban life, and various agricultural crises. 29 Further rationales include migrants’ hopes of
higher wages, better education, improved health services, and lower infant mortality. 30
Urban areas are ill-equipped to support such swift growth and massive squatting ensues. 31
The result of which is often the promulgation of vagrancy laws that further enhance the
illegality of such squatter populations. 32 To survive in rapidly developing countries,
migrants are often forced into informality. 33
¶10
Immigration commonly leads to informality. Often, immigrants must survive on
the margins, without legal protections, because they are either illegal or invisible to the
law for long periods after arrival. 34 Immigrants that seek asylum regularly toil through a
long examination process that only infrequently leads to legal recognition. 35 Thus, many
immigrants remain undocumented, surviving in the informal economy and facing the
constant threat of deportation. 36 The “in transit” period for asylum seekers is one of
“vulnerability, insecurity and socio-economic marginalization,” in which informals often
23

John Linarelli, Anglo-American Jurisprudence and Latin America, 20 FORDHAM INT ’L L.J. 50, 51
(1996).
24
This has been identified as the largest challenge facing Latin American legal systems. Hon. Roberto
G. MacLean, The Social Efficiency of Laws as an Element of Political and Economic Development, 4-SPR
NAFTALBRA 6, 7 (1998).
25
Id. at 10.
26
Id.
27
Id.; Linarelli, supra note 23, at 52.
28
DE SOTO, THE M YSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 17-18, 149-50.
29
DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 5, at 8-9.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 10-11; DE SOTO, THE M YSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 17-18.
32
Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the Regulation of Harvest
Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 667, 674-77 (2004).
33
DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 5, at 11.
34
Aspasia Papadopoulou, Smuggling Into Europe: Transit Migrants In Greece, 17 J. REFUGEE STUD .
167, 171, 175 (2004).
35
Id. at 171.
36
Id.
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seek accommodation in refugee camps. 37 Such restrictive immigration policies are not
per se violations of human rights. However, it is worth noting that their effect of pushing
people into extralegal sectors, where they are identified as illegal aliens that lack rights
and face deportation, undoubtedly leads to violations.
¶11
Informal sectors will always be present to some degree, even in the most efficient
economies. Income will never be fully reported and unlawful behavior will persist. It is
preferable to have some extralegal norms and practices because, if nothing else, it avoids
overly- invasive and inefficient regulatory schemes. The pervasiveness of extralegal
sectors in developing and transitional countries leads to the conclusion that their primary
cause is the inability to establish a coherent and workable market system, governed by
predictable and regularly enforced laws. As will be shown in the following section, the
result is that it simply costs less to exist outside of the law.
D. The Costs of Formality v. Informality: Hernando De Soto and the Case of Peru
¶12

Many noteworthy scholars have studied the informal economy, perhaps none more
so than Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto and his think tank, the Institute for Liberty
and Democracy (ILD). 38 De Soto’s influential book, “The Other Path,” takes an in-depth
look at informality in Peru, focusing on the incoherence and costs of the legal system as
the primary factors pushing people into extralegal existence. De Soto sees legal reform
and specifically a formalized system of property rights as the answers to bringing people
into the system. Such legal recognition of property ownership combats poverty by
allowing the poor to use the assets they already possess as a means to create capital. The
analysis of Peru in the late 1980’s has continued relevance because of its tremendous
depth in detailing the cost differential between legal inclusion and exclusion. Moreover,
the problems chronicled are likely representative of those still existing in the developing
world. De Soto and his research team discovered that 48% of the economically active
population and 61.2% of work hours were devoted to informal activities, making up
38.9% of Peru’s GDP. 39
¶13
The costs of formality in Peru were staggering. In an experiment to test the cost of
access to industry, De Soto’s team followed all of the legally required steps and
procedures to open a legal sewing business. 40 This process took 289 days of bureaucratic
procedures, eleven permits, and a total cost of $1231, or thirty-two times the monthly
minimum living wage. 41 Despite a desire to abide by all the legal rules, the applicants
were still forced to pay two bribes in order to allow their permit requests to proceed. 42
Likewise, legally purchasing a piece of urban land for housing required an adjudication
and numerous permits and certifications totaling a process of almost seven years, with
almost five years of minimum wage being required for the adjudication alone. 43 The cost
of access to trade was equally exorbitant. It took forty-three days and $590.56 (fifteen
times the monthly minimum wage) to open a formal store and fourteen and a half years of
37

Id. at 175.
MacLean, supra note 24, at 15.
39
DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 5, at 12.
40
Id. at 134.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 136, 139.
38
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waiting time to open a formal public market. 44 Finally, the cost of access to public transit
entailed a twenty-six month wait to obtain legal recognition for operating a minibus
route. 45 Once legality is achieved, dramatic costs remain to sustain formal legality. De
Soto’s team discovered that firms’ profits would be more than quadrupled without the
substantial costs imposed by the administrative procedures to stay formal, which include
endless streams of documents and an inflexible government staff. 46
¶14
The exorbitant costs of formality are in no way unique to Peru. It takes 168
bureaucratic steps and thirteen to twenty- five years to formalize informal urban property
in the Philippines. 47 Gaining access to desert land and registering property rights for
construction purposes takes between six and fourteen years in Egypt, which explains why
4.7 million Egyptians have chosen to build their dwellings illegally. 48 Finally, after
leasing land for five years in Haiti, it requires 111 steps and 4112 days to complete a
sales contract. 49 Hence, the steep costs of formality are a pervasive phenomenon.
¶15
Yet, there are also costs to informality. In order to avoid penalties and detection,
informal businesses must disperse employees, use less-visible workplaces, refrain from
advertising, avoid certain marketplaces, bribe authorities, and keep scale small. 50 Perhaps
the largest cost is the inability to use one’s assets as collateral for credit, which denies
funding and prohibits growth. 51 Further, informals incur inevitable net transfer costs. De
Soto found that informals transferred approximately thirteen percent of GDP to the
formalized citizenry through taxes levied on inputs purchased, inflation costs incurred by
an inability to use banks, and the steep interest rates charged in the informal credit
market. 52 Finally, there are various costs associated with the inability to easily transfer
property, defending possessions, constant threats of eviction, inability to use the contract
system, inefficiencies of extra-contractual law, lack of insurance, and the absence of
means to share risk or protect innovation. 53 Thus, while the cost of formality in Peru was
prohibitively high for most of the population, the informal alternative was not without
considerable expense.
¶16
De Soto and his ILD team actually had the opportunity to put many of their legal
reforms into place in Peru and have been contracted by foreign governments to research
and assist in similar government transformations. 54 In Peru, the ILD helped implement
approximately 400 new laws and ma naged one of the largest titling, or property-creation,
projects ever employed. 55 Although their projects were interrupted the results are
significant. Recording of real estate ownership dropped from over twelve years down to
44

Id. at 143-44.
Id. at 146.
46
Id. at 151.
47
DE SOTO, THE M YSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 22-23.
48
Id. at 20, 24-25.
49
Id. at 26-27.
50
DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 5, at 153.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 155-56.
53
Id. at 158-72; DE SOTO, THE M YSTERY OF CAPITAL , supra note 7, at 83.
54
Institute for Liberty and Democracy, Origins of the ILD, at http://www.ild.org.pe/eng/history1.htm
(last visited Apr. 6, 2006); Institute for Liberty and De mocracy, ILD In a Nutshell, at
http://www.ild.org.pe/eng/contenido.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
55
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE ECONOMIC A NSWER TO TERRORISM , at xxiii (Basic
Books 2002) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE ECONOMIC A NSWER].
45
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one month at 1% of the previous cost. 56 By 2000, 1.9 million urban buildings
representing 75% of the extralegal market were legalized. 57 Beginning a legal business
went from around 300 days to one. 58 Finally, Peru’s participation in the international
cocaine market declined. 59 All of these reforms and administrative simplifications led to
very high economic growth rates, including the worlds highest at 12% in 1994. 60
¶17
The Peruvian case study about the costs of formality and potential for reform is
dramatic. However, this is not to say that the informal economy has a one-size fits all
remedy. The work of De Soto, the ILD, and other scholars merely serves to illustrate the
depth, costs, and challenges posed by extralegal sectors as we turn to the effects of
informality on human rights.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATED
¶18

Studies of the informal economy have made a reasonably comprehensive
examination of informality’s effects upon property and development rights, which will be
analyzed within. This section will also focus upon the informal economy as an
impediment to fulfilling nearly every significant human right including, inter alia, rights
regarding: political participation, judicial remedies, protection from arbitrary or unlawful
inference and attack, equal protection, slavery, freedom of movement, access to services,
adequate standards of living, women’s and children’s rights, social security, education,
and marriage. Because research in many of these areas has yet to be taken up or is
inadequate, this section will necessarily remain theoretical and broad. The goals here are
to analyze what is known, ask the right questions, and draw reasonable inferences. As an
initial matter, this analysis is not aimed at the extralegal activities of, for example, a
mechanic who moonlights for cash, but rather the large portion of the informal sector
made up of those that the law effectively forces into informality.
A. Development and Property Rights
1. Right to Development

¶19

The right to development is rooted in the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Human Rights Conventions. 61
According to the Declaration on the Right to Development:
1. The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of
which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in,
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be
fully realized.
56

Id. at xxv i-xxviii.
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at xxvi-xxviii.
60
Id. at xxvii.
61
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Right to Development:
Background, at http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right-01.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
57
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2. The human right to development also implies the full realization of the
right of peoples to self-determination, which includes, subject to the
relevant provisions of both International Covenants on Human Rights, the
exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural
wealth and resources. 62
Both individuals and peoples can invoke the right to development, which imposes duties
of promoting fair development and effective international cooperation upon both
individual states and the international community. 63
¶20
Does informality frustrate the right of individual development? The answer appears
to be a resounding yes. Informality perpetuates poverty by removing the protections of
the legal regime from the poor, denying them the ability to use their assets as capital, and
ultimately foreclosing the opportunity to create wealth. 64 This undoubtedly violates their
inalienable rights to contribute to economic development, self-determination, and to
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources, as called for in the Declaration.
Further, because informals effectively have no interaction with the State unless they
commit a serious crime, 65 they are not able to exercise their right to participate in and
contribute to political development.
¶21
Informality also frustrates the right to development as a people. The global poor
own an estimated $9.3 trillion in dead capital. 66 These are assets that cannot be used to
their fullest in creating wealth. 67 Dead capital includes untitled property, unregistered
businesses, and dwellings that could be seized at any time. 68 Developing nations are
made to depend upon foreign aid, which is wildly insufficient and unnecessary if only
this dead capital could be utilized. 69 For example, the dead capital of the poor in Egypt is
worth fifty- five times as much as the sum of all direct foreign investment ever recorded
there, including construction of the Suez Canal and the Aswan Dam. 70 Haiti is the
poorest nation in Latin America, yet the poor have assets worth more than 150 times
greater than all foreign investment received since their independence in 1804. 71 As the
richest country on Earth, it would take the United States more than 150 years to transfer
to the world’s poor the resources they already possess if we were to increase foreign-aid
to the United Nations’ recommended level. 72 Informality is denying entire peoples their
62

Declaration on the Right to Development art. 1, paras. 1, 2, G.A. Res. 41/128 (1986), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
63
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Right to Development: The
Content of the Right to Development, at http://www.unhchr.ch/development/right-02.html (last visited
Mar. 10, 2006).
64
Interview by Dario Fernandez-Morera with Hernando De Soto, REASON ONLINE M AGAZINE , available
at http://reason.com/DeSoto.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
65
Claudia Fonseca, Inequality Near and Far: Adoption As Seen From the Brazilian Favelas, 36 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 397, 401 (2002).
66
DE SOTO, THE M YSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 35.
67
Hernando De Soto, Citadels of Dead Capital: What the Third World must learn from U.S. history,
REASON ONLINE M AGAZINE, (May 2001), available at http://www.reason.com/0105/fe.hs.citadels.shtml
(last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
68
See generally, DE SOTO, THE M YSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 5.
71
Id.
72
Id.
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right to development by keeping them from participating in economic development,
infringing self-determination through unnecessary foreign involvement, and denying
sovereignty over their resources.
2. Property Rights
¶22

Property rights and human rights share a tense yet inseparable history. Scholars
have noted that formal property rights and libertarian autonomy conflict with human
rights provisions relying upon government action. 73 Property rights are a “negative” right
of non- interference that strongly emphasizes the protection of individual liberty. 74 The
human rights regime incorporates property rights and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights states that: “[e]veryone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others.”75 And “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”76
¶23
It is clear that informals who lack access to a formalized system of property
ownership are denied their rights from the Declaration to legally own their property.
Constant threats of arbitrary eviction further infringe these rights. The right to resell
property in a formalized recording system protects and enhances property rights, allows
assets to be fungible, and provides security to transactions. 77 These benefits of the
formalized system are not available to informals, who are generally forced to transfer
property by means of extralegal social contracts. 78 Sales are effectively restricted to
acquaintances in the informal economy and occur at greatly market-reduced prices. 79
¶24
The informal economy’s denial of property rights is arguably its most significant
deprivation of human rights because many of the other rights discussed, such as political
rights, social services, and education, often depend upon property ownership. Further,
the extralegal sectors denial of property rights is bad policy that perpetuates poverty
through impeding the transformation of assets into capital. Moreover, there is no
incentive to improve property when it can be taken at any time. The adverse
ramifications of this problem are exemplified by narcotics producers who lack incentives
to invest in legal crops that take longer to grow, but yield higher profits. 80
¶25
The informal economy is a large impediment to the attainment of development and
property rights, but hope remains. De Soto points out that the current industrial
revolution in the Third World and post-Communist countries is moving at a much faster
pace and involving more people than its Western predecessor. 81 The lesson he draws
from the experience of the West, is that stopgap solutions were not enough. 82 Instead,

73

Robin Paul Malloy, Equating Human Rights and Property Rights—The Need for Moral Judgment in
an Economic Analysis of Law and Social Policy, 47 OHIO ST . L.J. 163-65 (1986).
74
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON , INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT : LAW , POLITICS,
M ORALS, 363 (2d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
75
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17, para. 1, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
76
Id. art. 17, para. 2.
77
DE SOTO, THE M YSTERY OF CAPITAL, supra note 7, at 56-62.
78
DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 5, at 163.
79
Id. at 160, 166.
80
Fernandez-Morera, supra note 62.
81
Id.
82
Id.
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legal reform and formal property systems were needed to raise the standard of living. 83
Thus, while the extralegal sector is a human rights concern, it can also be the answer to
attaining development and empowerment through reform that brings dead capital assets
within the legal system. 84
B. Civil and Political Rights
1. Political Participation
¶26

Political participation as a human right is found in both article 21 of the Universal
Declaration, 85 and more significantly, article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). The latter states:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without . . .
unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free
expression of the will of the electors . . . . 86

¶27

Political participation and the extralegal sectors of the developing and postCommunist world seem to be conceptually incompatible. The ICCPR promises
“citizens” the right and the opportunity to participate, but how many informals are
bestowed with the rights of full citizenship? Sometimes they are literally not citizens and
other times they are practically not able to participate as citizens. The Covenant assures a
freedom of participation without “unreasonable restrictions.” The wholesale exclusion of
the informals from the formal legal regime must necessarily qualify as such an
unreasonable restriction. Moreover, voting itself seems to be an unlikely occurrence.
Those living in informal housing are usually squatting and may not have a recognized
address or the proper documentation required for registered voting. One study found that
in Brazilian “lawless zones” most workers had no Social Security numbers, no identity
documents, and no voter registration cards. 87 For these reasons, many of those who exist
within the extralegal economy are undoubtedly precluded from political participation.
¶28
Voting, even where it takes place, may be both a less responsible and effective form
of political participation for informals. Most informals do not pay taxes because their
jobs are not legally recognized, therefore if they are voting, they may be doing so
irresponsibly because they will not have to pay for the decisions they make.
Representation without taxation may be a way of leveling an unequal society, but perhaps
not one that encourages fiscal responsibility. Further, while groups such as students,
83
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retirees, and the disabled are generally allowed to participate despite their vastly reduced
tax-burden, they are still treated as important segments of the electorate based upon their
numbers, organization, and the expectation that they financially contribute at some point.
This influence is a stark contrast from the informals who are outcast and ignored. Under
these conditions, informality effectively denies the human right of political participation,
regardless of whether or not voting occurs.
2. Effective Judicial Remedies
¶29

Problems of government inefficiencies, corruption, and irrational legal regimes are
discussed throughout this article. While the political branches of many developing and
transitioning nations have exacerbated the problem of informality, judicial branches have
faired no better. The World Bank has recognized that “[u]nreliable judiciaries hinder
development, discourage and distort trade, and foster corruption.”88 An effective legal
system and an independent, respected judiciary are necessary to assist in the transition to
free markets. 89 Despite the obvious importance of universal judicial access, informals are
the least likely to use the formal judicial system, but most in need of legal protection. 90
¶30
Article 2 of the ICCPR echoes and expands upon article 8 of the Universal
Declaration by declaring that:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted. 91
¶31

Yet, how can an “effective remedy” be guaranteed without access to the judiciary?
Further, how can the guarantee of “enforcement” be carried out when the “competent
authorities” are the same ones who exclude, discriminate against, and ignore the
informals? The skepticism in these questions is supported by public perceptions in
88
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developing countries of an elitist, arbitrary judiciary92 that is corrupt and inefficient. 93
Further, there is a consensus that judgments do not reconcile the law with social realities94
and that unjust application of law by courts has become only graver as the pressures that
lead to informality continue. 95
¶32
The informal sector has responded by developing an informal jurisprudence out of
the need for a dispute resolution mechanism. This has been called “dynamic”
jurisprudence and it gives informals a set of non-static legal norms to apply. 96 For
example, “invasion contracts” bind informals together when taking over land for
settlement. 97 While these judicial mechanisms can be relatively effective for some
matters, such as disputes between informals, they are not an effective means of ensuring
that the state is living up to its human rights obligatio ns. In such cases, a formalized
judiciary is essential.
¶33
Many countries with large informal economies have very weak and ineffective
judicial systems. 98 The informal economy is likely perpetuated because people neither
trust the courts nor can afford to bring their suits. Further, it is probably often the case
that informals cannot bring claims due to the illegality of their actions. For these reasons,
informals are forced to deal with disputes themselves. Thus, broadly, one more important
actor in the protection of human rights is not fulfilling its role, and more narrowly, the
human right of access to effective judicial remedies is denied.
3. Protection from Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference and Attacks
¶34

Article 17 of the ICCPR provides that: “1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the
law against such interference or attacks.”99
¶35
The informal sector is problematic for the enforcement of this human right for two
significant reasons. First, those who live in informal housing may be subject to arbitrary
interference with their homes at any time. Because informals are forced into squa tting,
they have no formal protection against invasions of their dwellings. Second, protection
of the law is not provided for most informals. Often, the police either ignore or are afraid
to enter extralegal zones. 100 Thus, law enforcement provides little or no protection.
Assuming that the police do respond, they may only exacerbate the problem for
informals. For example, the police in Thailand often simply return enslaved prostitutes
who run away to their owners. 101 Perhaps worse, corrupt police may prey further upon
the victim. Under such circumstances it would not be surprising if such victims choose
92
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not to avail themselves of formal protection. Moreover, the legal protections of the
judiciary are generally not available to informals. For all of these reasons, informality
frustrates the realization of the human right of protection from arbitrary or unlawful
interference and attacks.
4. Equal Protection
¶36

Article 26 of the ICCPR echoes and expands upon the article 7 of the Universal
Declaration by stating:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status. 102

¶37

The human right of equal protection of the law as effective protection against
discrimination on the ground of “other status” is noteworthy. Informality is certainly a
distinguishable social status that leads to substantial legal discrimination. This “other
status” discrimination is evident from the aforementioned lack of police protection for
informals, the way the law removes this entire class of people from the formal regime,
and the unequal access to and treatment within the judicial system. In much of the world,
the legal treatment of informals is to exclude and ignore them; this is a far cry from
achieving the human right of equal protection before the law.
5. Slavery

¶38

The popular conception that slavery has ended, or been nearly eradicated, is a
myth. 103 Slavery in its various forms, including chattel slavery, is still found in alarming
numbers in countries representing all stages of development. 104 ICCPR article 8 provides
that: “1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms
shall be prohibited. 2. No one shall be held in servitude. 3. (a) No one shall be required to
perform forced or compulsory labour . . . .”105 Today, at least twenty-seven million
people around the globe are performing forced labor, without pay, under the threat of
violence. 106
¶39
Working conditions in formal sectors exist that represent something very close to de
facto slavery, especially for women pushed into semi- and no-skill jobs, subject to
inhumane conditions, low-wages, and physical and sexual abuse. 107 Not surprisingly,
modern slavery is a problem whose prevalence is associated with the informal economy.
102
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Examples include full chattel slavery, domestic housekeeping, sweatshop work, sex
trafficking, debt bondage, restaurant/hotel work, and forced agricultural labor. 108 These
indisputable violations of the human right to be free from slavery are clearly fueled by
the existence of extralegal sectors. While the informal economy allows slavery to
survive, the presence of over 10,000 forced laborers in the United States demonstrates
that this is not merely a problem for the developing and transitioning worlds. 109 Thus,
much like other illegal activities such as drugs, weapons, and prostitution, slavery is
unlikely to be remedied by legal reform alone.
6. Freedom of Movement
¶40

The Universal Declaration guarantees that: “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each State.”110 This freedom of movement
can be directly denied to informals through vagrancy laws, migration-control systems
such as the Chinese hukou system, 111 and other restrictions that limit ones ability to live
in a city or region of their choice. Movement is also constrained indirectly by the denial
of property rights, which often forces informals to remain on their property in order to
guard it from invasion by the State or other informals. 112 Thus, the Universal Declaration
is again effectively thwarted.
C. Economic and Social Rights

¶41

Article 25 of the Universal Declaration broadly sets out many of the human rights
to which we now turn.
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,
old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. 113
1. Access to Services

¶42

The Universal Declaration’s article 21 states that: “[e]veryone has the right to equal
access to public service in his country.”114 Even if the State was willing to provide
services to informals, their inability to keep tabs on people existing outside of the legal
regime effectively precludes them from doing so. The fact that urban informals have
almost no contact with the State, unless they commit a serious crime, underscores their
108
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deprivation of services. 115 If even the police avoid informal settlements, then it can come
as no surprise that social services rarely visit such dwellings either. 116
¶43
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
article 12 recognizes the “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health.”117 Yet, health care is another issue that is
problematic with informality. Informal housing settlements often lack adequate
infrastructure to provide proper sanitation, clean water, sewage treatment, etc. 118 These
inadequacies create a host of health problems that are aggravated by the lack of
government-sponsored social services available. Yet, informality is not entirely a victim,
as it also intensifies this problem. For example, assuming other political obstacles could
be overcome, the attainment of universal health coverage remains frustrated by the
tremendous tax evasions of the informal economy, which impedes the mobilization of
resources necessary to finance such a system. 119 Therefore, both the State’s treatment of
informals and the consequences of informality itself, jointly deny the human right of
equal access to public services.
2. Adequate Standard of Living
¶44

ICESCR article 11 sets out a series of recognized rights that make up the guarantee
of an adequate standard of living.
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to an adequate standard of living fo r himself and his family,
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate
steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the
essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental
right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and
through international co-operation, the measures, including specific
programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of
food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by
disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing
or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most
efficient development and utilization of natural resources;
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(b) Taking into account the problems of both food- importing and foodexporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food
supplies in relation to need. 120
¶45

The attainment of the provisions for adequate food and clothing are difficult to
measure. Yet, the fact that informal housing conditions are linked with a woefully
inadequate supply of basic services, including clean drinking water, 121 and are primary
causes of many injuries, psychological stresses, and both communicable and chronic
diseases, 122 indicates that there is work to be done here.
¶46
At least one billion people lack appropriate housing and billions more live in
informal settlements under various degrees of livability. 123 Conditions in Third World
cities have conspired to force people into informal housing based upon the rapid ruralurban migration, overall population growth, lack of funds, and lack of reasonably priced
housing. 124 In a study of informal housing in Egyptian cities, it was discovered that these
conditions have led to fifty- four percent of all housing units being informal. 125 Greater
Cairo alone had approximately sixty-eight informal settlements occupied by more than
11.39 million occupants. 126 The United Nations Center for Human Settlements (Habitat)
has recognized that “neither squatter settlement upgrading, nor sites and services projects
in their present form provide a long-term answer to the problems of accommodating the
growing numbers of urban poor at decent standards. As conceived at present, they will
not be able to guarantee that very large numbers of people will be able to satisfy their
basic rights with respect to shelter.”127
¶47
Because migrants and the poor are forced into informal housing settlements that
lack the necessary infrastructure to guarantee safe, sanitary living conditions, the human
right of attaining an adequate standard of living is not being realized by billions in the
informal sector.
3. Women’s Rights
¶48

The human rights regime aims to ensure equal rights for women, 128 while also
recognizing motherhood should be accorded special protections. 129 The Convention on
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is the only
human rights treaty that affirms the reproductive rights of women. 130 ICESCR article 10
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goes on to accord pregnant mothers “paid leave or leave with adequate social security
benefits.”131 Such rights are not found in the informal economy.
¶49
The various human rights instruments establish women’s rights to socioeconomic
mobility and opportunity through education and employment. 132 However, the informal
economy is a barrier to the attainment of this opportunity and it particularly affects
minority, immigrant, and indigenous women whose informal employment offers lower
levels of labor protections than the mainstream economy. 133
¶50
CEDAW additionally ensures that: “States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation
of prostitution of women.”134 Yet, such activities are prevalent and the informal economy
is where they exist.
¶51
While the great bulk of scholarship rests on the notion that informality is harmful to
women135 , under some circumstances informality can be relatively advantageous. Hunter
R. Clark has argued that the expansion of the informal economy throughout Africa has
benefited women because it allows them to avoid discriminatory regulation affecting
licenses, loans, and accounting that have been called a primary “mechanism of male
control over women.”136 This argument is not without merit, yet it is clear that by and
large women are especially vulnerable to the informal economy’s consequences of
malnutrition, hunger, poor health, 137 economic exploitation, and physical violence. 138 For
these reasons, extralegality remains very problematic to achieving women rights.
4. Children’s Rights
¶52

The need for special protections for those under the age of 18 is recognized in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and ICESCR. The human rights identified
in the CRC as being possessed by all children include: “the right to survival; to develop
to the fullest; to protection from harmful influences, abuse and exploitation; and to
participate fully in family, cultural and social life.”139 To these ends, the CRC goes on to
include a host of rights that individual government signatories are responsible for
promoting, 140 providing, 141 respecting, 142 and protecting. 143 It comes as no surprise that
131
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these noble ambitions are not realized for the young informals whose existence often
includes child labor, prostitution, slavery, trafficking, street living, begging, stealing, and
a host of health problems. 144 Further, CRC article 16 protects children from arbitrary
interferences with their home and guarantees the right to legal protection against such
actions. Yet, for the vast number of people without formal property ownership, this right
can be infringed at any moment. 145 The objectives of both the CRC and ICESCR to
protect and assist children cannot be accomplished when children live in extralegality.
5. Education
¶53

The right to education is recognized in article 26 of the Universal Declaration,
ICESCR article 13, and CRC articles 28 and 29. These instruments call for a broad right
that includes: compulsory education (available free to all), availability of secondary
education (including technical and vocational), equal access to higher education,
progressive introduction of free education at the secondary and higher levels,
development of the human personality and sense of dignity, development of school
systems, strengthening respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, furtherance
and maintenance of peace, and promotion of understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all peoples. 146
¶54
The informal economy presents abundant challenges to the provision of public
education. Potential difficulties consist of: enrollment without a recognized home
address, language barriers, exclusion of children not living in their state- mandated area, 147
and concern that enrollment will expose the family’s illegal status. Another large
obstacle to fully attaining this right is the prevalence of child labor in the developing
world. Even if the child attends school in addition to working, evidence shows that the
education suffers based on the child’s fatigue and lack of time for schoolwork, recreation,
and rest. 148 Compulsory education must also combat the skepticism of its worth in
informal sectors where the curricula may be viewed as unpractical, the costs of uniforms
and books as prohibitive, and the schedule as unaccommodating. 149 While informal
sectors are not always utterly denied the recognized human right to education, as they
may be with other human rights, it is apparent that informality presents numerous
impediments to the full and consistent realization of this right.
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6. Labor Conditions

¶55

Article 7 of the ICESCR broadly sets forth the recognized rights regarding labor
conditions.
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone
to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure,
in particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions
of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work;
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with
the provisions of the present Covenant;
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to
an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those
of seniority and competence;
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic
holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays. 150

¶56

ICESCR article 8 goes further to guarantee the right to form and join trade
unions. 151 As with many of the previous human rights analyzed, the guarantees regarding
safe working conditions, fair wages, equal opportunity, paid holidays, trade unions, etc.,
are generally not realities for workers in the informal economy. These guarantees are
meaningless because of the types of jobs that exist within the informal economy, such as
street vending, drug dealing, prostitution, and sweatshop labor. By delving deeper into
some of these extralegal jobs and the labor conditions surrounding them, we can better
examine the rights violations present.
¶57
Sweatshop labor continues to be a sad reality of modern production that
disproportionately victimizes women, who are essentially hidden from the outside world,
leading to little concern for their denials of basic human rights. 152 The working
conditions that define such labor are: remuneration below the minimum wage, extra- long
work shifts without overtime pay, harassment/abuse by supervisors, demands for sexual
favors, arbitrary punishments or firings, physical violence, restrictions upon restroom use,
150
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retaliation fo r complaints, hazardous conditions, overcrowding, and a lack of insurance,
paid holidays, vacations, sick days, job security, maternity leave, and breaks. 153 That
such conditions violate the human rights of labor standards requires no analysis and could
often be accurately equated with slavery, examined supra. 154
Sweatshops are usually found in areas immersed in repression and fear;155 hallmarks
of incoherent legal regimes and their corresponding informal economies. The prevalence
of sweatshop conditions is likely driven by both large corporations and the host countries
in which they manufacture. Corporations seek to maximize profits through
manufacturing in countries desperate for development. To avoid discouraging foreign
investment, these countries neither enforce many regulations nor punish violators. 156
Both the U.N. and I.L.O. have attempted to address the human rights violations of
sweatshops, 157 but their efforts are frustrated by the core question posed by this paper:
how do we provide any type of human rights to those in the informal economy?
The sex trade generally exists within the informal economy. While men, women,
and children all work in this sector, it is women who are most often forced into such work
based upon desperation and lack of employment alternatives in the formal economy. 158
While sex trade employment against ones will or out of necessity is egregious in and of
itself, it is the accompanying abuses that are particularly concerning from a human rights
standpoint. Sex workers routinely face arrest, police violence, extortion, assault, rape,
loss of child custody, robbery, humiliation, harassment, murder, and discrimination in
housing, employment and law enforcement. 159 Moreover, these informals are often the
victims of trafficking and fo rced prostitution. 160 Both the general illegality of such work
and the frequent abuse of workers by the police or State, leads to fear amongst sex
workers in reporting violations of their rights. 161 Thus, the informal economy creates and
perpetuates the human rights violations found in the sex trade.
In addition, the prevalence and conditions of child labor are human rights violations
found in the informal economy, as previously discussed generally and specifically as
affecting education. 162
Despite the existence of horrific extralegal working conditions, it is the manner by
which people enter such employment that is often most disturbing. According to the U.S.
State Department’s 2004 Trafficking in Persons Report, there are between 14,500 and
17,500 people trafficked into the United States annually, largely as an extreme abuse of
foreign migrant labor. 163 Globally, an estimated two to four million people are trafficked
153
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annually. 164 The informal economy is where these forms of modern slavery, sweatshops,
and child labor are found.
¶62
The United States presents an interesting case in extralegality because it is a country
that has an arguably good record in providing human rights and coherent legal regulation
to its citizens. However, with so many people being trafficked into the United States
every year, it may surprise many that the United States, despite its rule of law heritage,
also has a significant informal economy. The United States has its own problem with
sweatshops and labor conditions, as found Los Angeles’s garment industry. 165 Also,
prostitution, drug dealing, and forced domestic or manufacturing labor all add to the
unseemly side of the U.S. extralegal sector. Yet, perhaps some amount of informality is
desirable, given the existence of imperfect legislation and unfortunate social realities.
Moonlighting, street vending, and undocumented construction or agricultural labor may
be arguably beneficial in providing desired services, sometimes in jobs Americans are
unwilling to take, at prices that benefit consumers. Also, the informal economy is
perhaps the most important element of the economy on Native American Reservations. 166
It has even been argued that U.S. drug dealers have been able to find more respect, better
wages, and better labor conditions by leaving the formal economy where they were
exploited by abusive and often racist employers. 167 The sad reality of this claim is likely
true, yet such drug dealing perpetuates as many, if not more, destructive social realities as
it alleviates. Thus, while a small amount of certain informal activities do not necessarily
present obvious human rights concerns and in fact may alleviate some immediate social
inequities, it remains in the long-term best interests of everyone to attain legal inclusion
and the corresponding protection of their rights.
¶63
As with other rights discussed, the informal economy is not just the location of
labor rights abuses, but also an enabler of the problem. Because anyone can seize
informally possessed property, informals are often unable to leave their property to seek
out adequate formal sector employment. In countries where property rights have been
solidified and the economy has been formalized, there have been large increases in
people seeking jobs outside of the home. 168 Freedom from guarding ones property has
positive effects including increased wages and productivity, and reductions in child labor
and illegal drug manufacturing. 169 Thus, extralegality itself frustrates the enforcement of
human rights.
¶64
The problem of enforcing human rights regarding labor conditions in the informal
economy is difficult, if not impossible, as these workers lack the formal working status
necessary to claim their rights under national legislation. 170
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7. Social Security
¶65

ICESCR article 9 provides that: “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance.”171 For the
majority of informals, the attainment of this human right is impossible. Informals do not
pay taxes and often receive very little, if any, government services. Third World
governments rarely provide adequate levels of infrastructure to informal settlements to
guard against immediate health problems, much less providing funds for long-term social
insurance. 172 The concept of a human right to social security must seem absurd to the
many informals who live without sewage treatment, clean water, and other vital
government services.
8. Marriage and the Maintenance of the Family

¶66

There is a recognized human right to willfully enter into a legal marriage. Article
16 of the Universal Declaration states that: “[m]en and women of full age, without any
limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a
family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its
dissolution.”173 ICCPR article 23 goes on to guarantee: “1. The family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 2.
The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be
recognized.”174
¶67
In informal sectors, people are often removed from any contact with the State. It
has been reported that in a Brazilian “lawless zone” at least seventy- five percent of adult
couples with children were not legally married. 175 It is reasonable that people who spend
much time and energy eluding detection by the State would similarly see it as necessary
to avoid registering and legalizing their marital unions. Also, just as the bureaucratic red
tape required to secure titles and licenses can be prohibitive to an existence within the
law, the administrative procedures to procure a marriage license can be prohibitive to
seeking one out. 176
¶68
The destructive effects of informality are likely felt within formal marriages as well
because families may be broken up as spouses travel from rural areas to urban centers for
work. In sum, the delays, fears, disincentives, and familial strains caused by informality
create a significant impediment to exercising the human rights of legal marriage and the
maintenance of a family.
D. Note on Terrorism
¶69

Not all human rights issues involving extralegality fit neatly into the
aforementioned categories of rights. Terrorism presents just such a case.
171
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1. Right to Security

¶70

Article 3 of the Universal Declaration proclaims “the right to life, liberty and
security of person;” a right essential to the enjoyment of all other rights. 177 Terrorism is a
threat to security and as such the United Nations has adopted a host of treaties aimed at
combating and eradicating international terrorism. 178
¶71
Hernando De Soto’s seminal book, “The Other Path,” was written to show an
alternative to the teachings of a Maoist terror organization in Peru called “The Shining
Path.”179 This group paralyzed the judicial system, threatened judges, freed prisoners,
displaced over two million Peruvians from their homes, sent another one million into
voluntary exile, executed, tortured, scalped, and took control of much of Peru’s cocagrowing. 180 When the Shining Path were eventually defeated, some of the credit went to
the influence of “The Other Path.”181 Regardless of who or what deserves credit, De Soto
has some compelling thoughts on the linkage between informality and terror.
“[T]errorists . . . will always be around to champion the cause of the excluded.”182
“People don’t rebel because they are poor but because they are excluded from the system.
To give people a stake in the economy, to prove to them that government is in the
business of including them in formal society, is to put the terrorists out of business.”183
¶72
Today, terrorism is an ever-present threat and many protective measures have been
employed that conflict with human rights and liberties. 184 However, as “The Other Path”
demonstrates, both security and human rights enforcement can simultaneously be
obtained by promoting universal inclusion within the legal regime. This method of
guarding against terror, while increasing human rights protections, is particularly
attractive when alternatives include violence and greater infringements upon rights.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
¶73

Each informal sector possesses idiosyncrasies, based upon local circumstances and
traditions, which make a one-size-fits-all solution inappropriate. However, there are
some recognized approaches to battling extralegality that have either experienced success
or are theoretically promising. These approaches range from broad conceptual methods
that keep awareness of the consequences of informality in mind when affording rights
protections, to a variety of specific, targeted responses.
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¶74

Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen takes a less mechanical view of development in
arguing that freedom itself is not only the end goal of development, but also the means. 185
Because human freedom is the overarching objective, it, rather than some chosen list of
instruments or cunning development programs, should be the central focus of
development. 186 Sen recognizes that explicit and implicit bondages in the labor market
deny access to the free market. 187 This freedom-oriented view carries traction for the
informal economy where an inability to leave ones property to secure a formal job is just
such an implicit bondage.
¶75
The following are specific legal reforms that could help ensure the realization of
human rights by keeping people within the law: an adequate minimum wage, special
access to government programs for the traditionally discriminated against, improved
compulsory education, literacy programs, increased access to credit for the poor, land
reforms, and monitoring programs in economic sectors with traditionally informal
employees, such as agriculture, and domestic work. 188 Yet, for any legal reform, integrity
is vital. Reforms must emphasize the quality and credibility of State institutions, 189 which
will be enhanced by increasing regulatory transparency and opportunities for public input
in the legislative and regulatory process.
¶76
Titling programs, as previously discussed, are efforts to give the poor legal
ownership over what they already possess. This draws informals into the legal regime,
provides security for assets, protects and encourages investments, ensures the ability to
transact, grants access to formal credit, and serves as a means to increase tax revenues to
finance infrastructure improvements. 190 However, such programs also have substantial
costs associated with potential violence, preexisting ownership, corruption, and price
regressions. 191 Yet, overall these programs have experienced some notable successes and
offer perhaps the best chance for long-term poverty reduction and development. 192 When
titling programs are utilized, they should be implemented in ways that avoid reinforcing
certain structural barriers, such as the marginalization of women and the poor location of
titled lands for the poor, which impair social mobility and wealth accumulation. 193 These
measures will help ensure that informals brought into the legal regime are able to avoid
the exposure to disease, infrastructure failures, crime rates, etc., that they faced as
informals.
¶77
Microcredit programs are used to reduce poverty amongst the “poorest of the poor”
by increasing their income and productivity through access to credit. 194 The United
Nations has noted that such programs are especially beneficial to women’s
empowerment. 195 Typical activities pursued with microcredits include small-scale
185
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agriculture, manufacturing, and trade. 196 For human rights purposes, microcredit
programs can be a tool for moving extralegal activities into the formal economy. 197
¶78
The transition to market economies in post-Communist countries presents a special
economic case. While these countries also need to establish sound public institutions,
rule-of-law, and individual rights, they differ from the Third World in one important
economic aspect, the existence of a merchant middle class. 198 While this merchant
middle class exists largely underground, it has been argued that it could be drawn into
formality by legalizing their property rights and allowing expansion in the scope of their
activities. 199 Because transitioning economies face some different obstacles than the
Third World, remedies should be tailored accordingly.
¶79
A complimentary solution is offered through the human rights regime. By ratifying
human rights instruments, potentially powerful mechanisms are put in place for enforcing
rights. Countries are bound to abide by domestic law and obligations from international
treaties. When these obligations stem from ratified human rights treaties, systematic
failures to comply violates the rule of law, human rights, and potentially democratic
rights as well. Essentially, these violations reflect a right to live under a political system
that meets its self- imposed obligations. Utilization of the reporting and complaint
functions contained in many human rights instruments could he lp focus increased public
attention, both national and international, on the failure of the State to live up to its
human rights obligations. This would create pressure on the government to enforce their
own laws more effectively. Further, reporting gives a voice to people who have been
treated as invisible and the voicing of one’s oppression can be the path to liberation. 200
This solution is also attractive to help end the perception in much of the developing world
that human rights instruments are “just politics.”201
IV. CONCLUSION
¶80

This article has analyzed a vast array of human rights, and while not exhaustive, it
has demonstrated that the informal economy is extremely problematic to enforcement of
the human rights regime. The danger posed by such immense extralegality is that
international human rights instruments may be merely pie in the sky to the billions of
people who make up the informal economy. Even when such instruments are ratified by
States, this provides little comfort to the intended beneficiaries existing outside of the
legal regimes charged with implementing these rights. To make the human rights regime
a reality for those who need it most, they must be allowed into the formal system. The
question is how.
¶81
Programs providing increased wages, go vernment assistance, education, land
reform, labor monitoring, and access to credit are good starts in helping the poor create
wealth. However, institutional reform is needed to eradicate poverty, attain development,
and successfully transition to free market economies. Reforms that reduce bureaucratic
196
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red tape and bring the cost of legal compliance under that of extralegality are necessary to
formalize the previously excluded. Such reforms should also create greater regulatory
transparency, allow for citizen input, and aim at fighting corruption and inefficiency.
When tailored to local circumstances, titling programs that turn dead assets of the poor
into useable capital are great tools for poverty reduction, development, and attaining legal
inclusion for informals.
¶82
The human rights corpus itself should be emphasized as a major part of the solution.
The reporting functions contained within many of the human rights instruments can be
used to generate international pressure on governments to enforce their human rights
obligations. Moreover, global and regional human rights courts and commissions are
increasingly effective bodies for ensuring human rights enforcement. Because the
informal economy effectively interferes with the attainment of almost every significant
human right, these bodies should assume a leading role in fighting extralegality. The
human rights regime does not need to be merely a victim of informality, but can also be a
significant part of a solution that brings people within the law, alleviates poverty, and
creates coherent legal systems.
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